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1 
Economic and social conflicts, 
integration and constitutionalism in 
contemporary Europe 
 
1. The Reconfiguration of Economic and Social Conflicts in 
Europe and its Constitutional Implications 
Concern for economic and social conflicts remains one of the most defining features 
of contemporary political and constitutional systems. This is particularly evident in 
Western democracies where political alignments are traditionally conceived along 
the left-right divide, a conflict line whose current configuration is reminiscent of the 
ideological cleavages associated with the 19th and 20th Century class struggles. This 
type of conflict (hereafter, first type conflicts), alongside playing a crucial role in the 
shaping of national political identities, has prominently featured in constitutional 
history as one of the main variables contributing to the rise of constitutional 
democracy. 
Nowadays, such legal and political reality is under challenge. Of course, first type 
conflicts are a constant source of debate about the role of public powers, the scope for 
individual freedoms and the endowment of social rights. Nevertheless, their 
influence in political and constitutional structuring is increasingly questioned as far 
as an alternative type of economic and social conflict, namely that associated with the 
transnational mobility of factors of production (hereafter, second type conflicts), is 
gaining momentum. The rise of second type conflicts brings about a number of 
consequences on the established political and constitutional reality: the left-right 
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divide appears on the wane, and even constitutional democracy struggles to 
maintain its hold on political and social organisation.1 
In Europe, the constitutional2 implications of these processes are more dramatic than 
elsewhere. Basic considerations may explain such specificity. On the one hand, one 
must consider the weight of legal and political tradition: first type conflicts, 
ideological cleavages and constitutional democracy are elements that not only go 
into making up national communities, but are probably among the most telling 
aspects of Europeanness. On the other hand, the law of the European Union, a 
unicum in Western democracies, in carrying out the common market project 
amplifies the unsettling political and legal potential of second type conflicts.3 Indeed, 
in responding to the concerns emerging as to the mobility of factors of production, 
the law of the EU has progressively established a political and legal framework that 
in many aspects is alternative to that of states’ constitutional democracy. What is 
more, due to the ramifications inherent in market regulation and the nature of 
Community law, such an alternative framework not only defies the canons of states’ 
constitutionalism but, critically, it disputes their legal authority and ideological 
hegemony. As a consequence, the reconfiguration of economic and social conflicts as 
prompted by the common market project also brings about a conflict between legal 
orders and, notably, the clash between the constitutional narratives propounded by 
the EU and its member states (hereafter, third type conflicts). 
Despite their uneasy coexistence, all the listed conflicts happen to share a common 
feature: their solutions are not rigidly defined or, more accurately, their legal 
discipline is framed in open-ended terms. In fact, as both first and second type 
conflicts normally may invite a range of equally legitimate outcomes, also the 
tensions between Europe’s constitutional frameworks (i.e. the constitutional 
frameworks of the EU and those of its member states) may bring in a variety of 
                                                        
1 M. Revelli, Sinistra destra. L’identità smarrita (Laterza, 2009). 
2 But, arguably, also the political implications, see S. Bartolini, Restructuring Europe – Centre 
formation, system building, and political structuring between the nation state and the European 
Union (OUP, 2007), 354. 
3 See Case 265/95, Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959 and, more recently, Case 438/05, The 
International Transport Worker’s Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP 
and OŰ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. 
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possible adjustments. Admittedly, out there one finds not only disordered legal 
materials but also very basic doctrines ruling specific conflicts between EU or states 
norms.4 But when it comes to collisions between constitutional systems and, notably, 
between their distinct ideological conceptions of conflict, the utility of those doctrines 
may be questioned, and more sophisticated answers are needed to make some sense 
of such a fragmented and potentially contradictory political and legal reality. 
So far, the accounts put forward in relevant scholarly and doctrinal debates seem to 
follow three main conceptual frameworks. The first, the most positivist in nature, 
conceives of economic and social conflicts from the vantage point of the EU legal 
order.5 Accordingly, the conceptual framework associated with second type conflicts 
prevails over that of states’ constitutional democracy and, therefore, solutions to 
third type conflicts are formulated with the language of EU principles of economic 
law.6 The opposite approach, one where the constitutional framework associated 
with first type conflicts replaces at a EU level that of second type conflicts, was 
particularly popular prior to the debacle of the Constitutional Treaty. Constitutional 
lawyers seized the opportunity of the EU’s supposed constitutional momentum to 
overcome the latter original market texture, and to redefine it through the language 
of states’ common constitutional traditions.7 Against such a normalised background,8 
solutions to economic and social conflicts had still to be devised at a supranational 
level, although the methodology employed in framing and sorting them out had to 
reflect the EU’s newly acquired republican ethos.9 Finally, insights into our problems 
may also be found in the rich and articulate intellectual vein of constitutional 
                                                        
4 An exhaustive account for the EC supremacy doctrine and its national constitutional 
reservations is offered in B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal 
Order’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999), 177. 
5 For a valuable example, see G. Davies, The process and side-effects of harmonisation of European 
welfare states, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 2/06, 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/06/060201.html>. 
6 See, as significant examples, Case 112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und 
Planzüge v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 and Case 36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und 
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 
7 A. Manzella, ‘Dal mercato ai diritti’, in A. Manzella, P. Melograni, E. Paciotti, S. Rodotà (eds), 
Riscrivere i diritti in Europa (Il Mulino, 2001), 29. 
8 K. Lenaerts and D. Gerard, ‘The structure of the Union according to the Constitution for Europe: 
the emperor is getting dressed’ (2004) 29 European Law Review, 322, claiming that the EU differs 
from a state-like structure solely because of its coexistence with other sovereign entities. 
9 M. Kumm, ‘Beyond Golf Clubs and the Judicialization of Politics: Why Europe has a Constitution 
Properly So Called’ (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law, 517. 
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pluralism.10 Here, third type conflicts are addressed in mostly theoretical terms 
echoing longstanding debates on sovereignty.11 Solutions are broadly devised 
without specific distinctions or qualifications as to the substantive contents of those 
conflicts.12 Nonetheless, as far as a more horizontal configuration of the relationships 
between the legal orders is envisaged, constitutional pluralism may suggest that the 
issue at stake is not what conceptual framework must prevail, but how their 
competing substantive claims can be accommodated.13 
Arguably, all the aforementioned approaches capture important aspects of the 
phenomena at hand; yet, in sticking exclusively to their conceptual standpoints, they 
also offer partial accounts. Positivists, for example, fail to explain on what normative 
grounds it is legitimate for EU economic law if not to rewrite, at least to question 
states’ constitutionalism. Conventional constitutional narratives, instead, succeed in 
representing at a symbolic level the high stakes inherent in many of the conflicts at 
hand but, in most cases, they end up overlooking the persisting economic law 
structure beneath the declamation of EU values. A similar shortcoming permeates 
the approaches of constitutional pluralists. As noted, the latter are probably the most 
accurate in enhancing the multiplicity of vantage points and describing what is 
beyond raw legal materials. Yet, that also ends up being their most critical limit as 
not only do they fail to explain in substantive terms the constitutional implications of 
the process of reconfiguration of economic and social conflicts undergoing in Europe, 
but they all too often assume constitutional democracy to be the uncontested 
standard for assessing the legitimacy of European integration.14 As a result, how does 
one cope with the partiality of these approaches? How does one profit from their 
explanatory dividend? And is it possible to overcome their limits? 
                                                        
10 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review, 317.  
11 N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty – Law, State, and Practical Reason (OUP, 1999). 
12 M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe 
before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal, 262. 
13 M. Dani, ‘Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off its Debt to Functionalism?’ 
(2009) European Law Journal, 324. 
14 On such issue, see the critical remarks in G. Majone, ‘Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The 
Question of Standards’ (1998) 4 European Law Journal, 5-6. 
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This article argues not only that a more comprehensive theoretical and analytical 
framework bringing together previous approaches may be possible but, critically, 
that in interpreting the challenge posed by the reconfiguration of economic and 
social conflicts in Europe, it might deliver more than the sum of its single 
components. Indeed, my primary purpose here is essentially explanatory: the crux of 
the article is to provide an accurate account of the constitutional status quo and, 
namely, of the identities and the patterns of interactions of Europe’s constitutional 
frameworks as to economic and social conflicts.15 Prior to debating the constitutional 
solutions to third type conflicts, in fact, one ought first to break down the terms of 
the latter, describe the hallmarks of the constitutional responses to first and second 
type conflicts, and only at that point try to devise some kind of accommodation. But 
how can a similar exercise be structured? And what are the possible interpretive 
tools to penetrate and compare the reality of Europe’s constitutional frameworks?   
A valuable starting point for our analysis may be the rather elementary observation 
that both the EU and its member states are in the business of integration, a rather lax 
notion which is meant to respond to the conflicts between the subjects of a polity by 
establishing a variety of conditions which can range from peaceful coexistence to 
unity. The degree of integration as well as its specific definition and constitutional 
implications depend on the political and legal context in which it is pursued. In the 
EU, for example, integration is part and parcel of its constitutive mission and implies, 
broadly speaking, the cooperation of the member states in carrying out common 
policies as well as the establishment of civic bonds between the individuals and 
peoples of Europe. As to the member states, integration, though not being codified as 
their official philosophy, may still be regarded as an underlying ideal of their 
constitutional systems, for its call for cohesion and recognition among citizens easily 
matches their explicit democratic commitment.  
                                                        
15 As a consequence, to provide a comprehensive theory on the interactions between the EU and 
member states’ legal systems is beyond the purposes of this article. It will be for further research 
to discuss to what extent the achievements of the analysis herein conducted may be extended to 
other substantive areas. Similarly, for the purposes of this article other international legal 
frameworks related to the EU policies such as those of the UN, the WTO or the ECHR are not 
considered. 
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But apart from their current concretisations and descriptive accounts, is there a single 
concept of integration we may employ in the effort to explain the constitutional 
challenges Europe is experiencing as to its three types of conflicts?16 A positive 
answer in this regard may be found in constitutional theory and, notably, in Rudolf 
Smend’s Integrationslehre17 – a theory on integration and the role of the constitution 
conceived in the backdrop of the fierce struggles of the Republic of Weimar. 
Admittedly, Smend’s reflections do not address the multiplicity of conflicts 
previously mentioned. Nonetheless, the conceptual framework emerging from that 
theory not only may shed some light on the general content of the notion of 
integration but, arguably, may bring in a number of questions and insights which 
appear of the utmost importance in accounting for the constitutional aspects of 
Europe’s three types of conflict. 
On such premises, the following section II introduces the main aspects of Smend’s 
theoretical and constitutional thinking. His concept of integration is presented as the 
source of an analytical device that, if adequately refined, may help not only in 
structuring a comparative inquiry into the notions of integration developed in the EU 
and its member states, but also in qualifying the relationships between their 
constitutional frameworks at the intersection of economic and social law. Such 
comparative analysis is carried out in section III where the account of integration as 
Europe’s constitutional reason unfolds in three conceptually distinct steps. 
Subsection 1 looks within the original constitutional frameworks of the member states 
and the European Economic Community to identify in turn their distinct responses 
to first and second order conflicts. The contrast between such diverse strategies of 
integration reveals all the potential for third type conflicts inbuilt in the process of 
European integration. But against such a dramatic background, subsection 2 tells a 
more relaxed story, one where Europe’s constitutional frameworks, although not 
renouncing their original identities, evolve in a process whose prevalent traits are 
                                                        
16 For an attempt to build a concept of legal integration in Europe see G. Itzcovich, ‘Integrazione 
giuridica. Un’analisi concettuale’ (2005) Diritto Pubblico, 749. 
17 R. Smend, Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 1928). References below are 
made to the Italian translation: R. Smend, Costituzione e diritto costituzionale (Giuffrè, 1988, 
translation by F. Fiore and J. Luther). 
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adjustment and mutual accommodation. The disclosure of the potential for 
coherence inherent in the interactions between constitutional frameworks leads, in 
subsection 3, to the description of a more advanced stage of integration. Emphasis 
here is on the porousness and overlaps between the legal systems of the EU and 
those of its member states. Such features, it is argued, give rise to an unresolved 
disjunction between a one-dimensional social reality developing across the 
constitutional frameworks, and the still segmented conceptualisations of conflict and 
integration proffered by the latter.  
As section III exhausts the explanatory part of the article, section IV points out a few 
critical remarks on the overall constitutional setting resulting from the interactions 
between and across Europe’s constitutional frameworks. It is observed that for all the 
achievements in the field of legal integration (including also the possibility of 
devising virtuous solutions to third type conflicts), Europe’s constitutional 
frameworks perform poorly in terms of the effective integration of the peoples who 
live in Europe. Empirical considerations will reveal that the current legal reality 
meets the demands of only a rather narrow social elite including essentially the 
actors more deeply engaged in the processes of transnational mobility. As long as 
large portions of the European population continue to remain underrepresented, it is 
argued that the current structuring of Europe’s constitutional frameworks is destined 
to appear and be partial. This invites a more profound consideration of the remit and 
intensity of supranational integration, and suggests the need for more robust 
procedural entitlements to ensure the active participation in policy-making of a 
broader social constituency. 
 
2. Smend’s Theory of Integration as Analytical Device 
As anticipated, Rudolf Smend’s theory of integration was conceived in the turmoil of 
the Weimar Republic, probably the period of European history in which concerns for 
the disruptive potential of economic and social conflicts were more acutely 
manifested. Such concerns rarely surface in the text of Verfassung und 
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Verfassungsrecht. Nonetheless, the insistent quest for unity and reconciliation 
inspiring Smend’s intellectual contribution echoes the more explicit efforts 
undertaken by the prolific German constitutional scholarship of the time18 to figure 
out adequate constitutional responses to the upcoming tide of social and political 
disintegration.19 Smend’s theory, an alternative to Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre,20 may be 
ascribed to the category of the material conceptions of the constitution and 
constitutional law.21 But rather than envisioning, as in Carl Schmitt’s decisionism, an 
escalation in the process of disintegration leading up to civil war and, ultimately, to 
the establishment of a constitutional order by hegemonic political forces, Smend 
cultivates the opposite idea of civilizing the conflict and promoting social 
reconciliation in the polity.22 On this basis, the general theory of integration lays the 
conceptual grounds for a theory on the role of the constitution, the legal device 
expected to regulate the process of integration. 
For most of the 19th Century, European constitutional theories had apparently 
overlooked the organisation of society and, notably, economic and social conflicts. 
Constitutions were generally understood as ruling over the organisation of 
government and, at most, as affording a limited degree of protection to a limited 
catalogue of human rights.23 The unity of the polity was not perceived as a 
contentious issue: at a symbolic level, constitutions claimed to be a product of 
mythical unitary entities such as the Nation or the State;24 at a more operational level, 
gender- and census-based exclusionary rules contained in the electoral legislation 
ensured political homogeneity.25 As a consequence, the unity of national 
                                                        
18 For a survey on Weimar constitutional debates see P. C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the 
Crisis of German Constitutional Law – The Theory & Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Duke 
University Press, 1997) and A. J. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds), Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis 
(University of California Press, 2000). 
19 G. Zagrebelsky, Introduzione a R. Smend, Costituzione e diritto costituzionale, cit., 1. 
20 For the harsh critique of Kelsen’s theoretical approach, see Smend, cit., 59-60 and 62-63. For 
the response see H. Kelsen, Der Staat als Integration (Springer Verlag KG, 1930). References 
below are made to the Italian translation: H. Kelsen, Lo stato come integrazione (Giuffré, 2001, 
translated by M. A. Cabiddu). 
21 Caldwell, cit., 121. 
22 Zagrebelsky, Introduzione, 2-3. 
23 Notably, only the so-called first generation of fundamental rights was protected and no judicial 
protection was afforded to violations of fundamental rights perpetrated at a legislative level. 
24 M. Dogliani, Introduzione al diritto costituzionale (Il Mulino, 1994), 200-208. 
25 R. Bin, ‘Che cos’è la Costituzione?’ (2007) Quaderni Costituzionali, 16-19.  
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communities could be taken as given,26 and only occasionally could social conflicts 
attain constitutional relevance as enabling governments to adopt measures of 
political emergency.27 
After World War I and, critically, the German and Bolshevik revolutions, concerns 
for previously neglected economic, social and political conflicts entered the 
constitutional scene.28 At that juncture, not only did the unity of the state and society 
appear controversial, but also the very idea of invoking abstract a priori entities, such 
as the Kaiserprinzip or the Grundnorm, to prevent disintegration and maintain the 
coherence of the polity seemed to Smend fatally undermined.29 Conflicts at that time 
began to be incorporated in a new generation of constitutions, and constitutional law 
had to renew its role and concepts accordingly.30 
Smend’s theoretical contribution in this regard draws explicitly from Litt’s general 
theory on the science of the spirit, a philosophical source which allows him to devise 
in turn a theory of the state, a theory of the constitution and, finally, interpretive 
considerations on the Weimar constitution.31 It is in fact with an explicit reference to 
Litt’s dialectic approach that Smend opens Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht and 
develops his critique of contemporary material theories of the state. The failure of the 
latter, observes Smend, is largely a result of their unproductive focus on antinomies 
such as that between the individual and the community or the individual and the 
State. For Smend such an antinomic configuration is misleading: the individual-State 
relationship is not a question of values and, hence, of choice between individualism 
or collectivism, but a matter of structure.32 As such, an appropriate conceptualisation 
requires an enquiry into the phenomenological structure of the ego. Both the 
individual and the community, in fact, cannot be conceived of in isolation as rigidly 
defined, monolithic and opposing entities:  
                                                        
26 G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite (Einaudi, 1992), 36. 
27 Bin, Che cos’è la Costituzione?, 17. 
28 Bin, Che cos’è la Costituzione?, 20-22. 
29 Zagrebelsky, Introduzione, 9 and Dogliani, cit., 279. 
30 Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite, 48. 
31 Smend, cit., 53-54. 
32 Smend, cit., 64 




The ego is not conceivable first in itself and then as causal for spiritual 
life, but only to the extent that it spiritually exists, expresses itself, 
understands, takes part in the spiritual world; that is, the extent to 
which it is in some general sense a member of the community, 
intentionally connected to others. It can only fulfil and shape its 
essence through spiritual life, which is social in structure. 
Even less is it the case that there is a collective ego based on itself. 
Collectivities are merely the unified structures of the experiences of 
meaning by individuals; not their product, however, but their 
necessary essence. Development of essence and creation of meaning 
are necessarily “socially linked”; they are essentially a meshing of 
individual and super-individual life.33 
 
According to this view, the individual and the community are no longer to be treated 
as separate entities; on the contrary, they are best to be regarded as moments of a 
process of unitary dialectic coordination.34 
A similar general conceptual framework informs Smend’s theory of the State. The 
unity of the State is identified in the structure of the individual-State interactions, a 
circular movement consisting of a continuous mutual identification of the State and 
the individuals. In this process one may not find any hierarchy or Archimedean 
point:35 individuals’ participation in social life reflects a stimulus stemming from the 
community, an entity that for its part exists only as the essence of individuals’ 
experiences. Consequently, the state-individual coordination comes out as a restless 
and self-referential oscillation which neither transcends its constitutive moments nor 
achieves a more advanced state.36 
Smend names a similar reality as integration, a concept that leads him to revisit in 
radical terms the inherited notion of state as a physical entity.37 In his words:  
 
                                                        
33 Passage extracted from Jacobson and Schlink, cit., 216. 
34 Smend, cit., 65-66. 
35 Smend, cit., 69-72. 
36 Zagrebelsky, Introduzione, 13, correctly observing that this movement does not amount to a 
Hegelian dialectic process. 
37 Smend, cit., 75-76. 
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… the state […] is not a static whole that issues individual 
manifestations of life, laws, judgements, diplomatic and administrative 
acts. Instead, it only exists at all in these various manifestations of life 
to the extent that they are activations of an overall spiritual context, 
and in the even more important renewals and formations that act upon 
this context itself. It exists and is present only in this process of 
constant renewal, continuously being-experienced-anew; it exists, to 
borrow [Ernest] Renan’s famous characterization of the nation, 
because of a plebiscite repeated daily. It is this central process of state 
life, or if one prefers, its central substance, which I have elsewhere 
suggested be called integration.38 
 
Integration, therefore, is the reality and the central substance of the State. But what is 
integration actually about? What are the concrete processes Smend has in mind when 
referring to it? In Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht Smend sketches a taxonomy of the 
modes of integration. The concrete foundation of the reality of the state is the vector 
resulting from the combination of different forms of integration, and the main 
combinations produce the different forms of state.39 Personal integration, for 
instance, is about embodying, representing, maintaining but also transforming the 
unity of the polity and its fundamental legal convictions – a consociational function 
that Smend identifies especially in the monarchy but also, although to a different 
extent, in the cabinet and the bureaucracy.40 Functional integration,41 on the other 
hand, relates to all the procedures constituting forms of collective life. Examples in 
this regard abound spanning from military marches to elections, even though 
Smend’s main focus is predictably on the formation of political will and, notably, on 
domination and processes based on the majority rule such as parliamentary decision-
making. Finally, material integration42 points to the processes of identification and 
unification through substantive values, a composite category including elements 
such as flag, territory and human rights. 
                                                        
38 Passage extracted from Jacobson and Schlink, cit., 217-218. 
39 Smend, cit., 111. 
40 Smend, cit., 82-88. 
41 Smend, cit., 88-99. 
42 Smend, cit., 100-110. 
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In all of these dimensions, the constitution is expected to favour the process of 
integration and contribute to the renewal and regeneration of the life of the State. 
According to Smend 
 
… the constitution is the legal order of the State, or more precisely, of 
the life through which the state has its reality – namely, of its process 
of integration. The meaning of this process is the constantly renewed 
production of the totality of the life of the state, and the constitution 
provides the legal norms for various aspects of this process.43 
 
But what is the relationship between the constitution and the process of integration? 
And how may constitutional norms contribute to the latter? This issue is not fully 
spelled out in Smend’s theory of the constitution. Nonetheless, in many passages he 
seems to regard integration as an essentially endogenous and spontaneous process.44  
The constitution may only facilitate, stimulate or limit this process since the state and 
its life by no means can be externally guaranteed. But what if the impulse to 
integration is absent? Can integration be the object of a top-down or even imposed 
constitutional strategy?45 Smend does not deal with this critical aspect of his theory. 
In concluding Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht he simply affirms that his investigation 
presupposes the concept of state, but leaves unanswered the question of its 
achievement.46  
To some commentators silence on this specific regard has appeared rather 
ambiguous,47 a reaction which seems justified particularly if combined with the 
sympathetic language Smend dedicates to fascism and dictatorial regimes in a 
number of other passages of his work.48 For our purposes, however, such ambiguity 
may turn out to be intellectually attractive since it unveils a more controversial side 
                                                        
43 See Jacobson and Schlink (eds), cit., 240. 
44 See Smend, cit., 150, 152, 156-157. 
45 Zagrebelsky, Introduzione, 15. 
46 Smend, cit., 254. 
47 Zagrebelsky, Introduzione, 15. 
48 See, for instance, Smend, cit., 80 and 173-174. The fact that organicist elements loom in 
Smend’s theory is evidenced also by Kelsen, cit., 49 and 123. 
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of the concept of integration. In Smend’s theoretical framework, indeed, integration 
occurs in a social and political context which has already consolidated sufficient 
conditions of stability and reciprocal recognition between individuals and political 
groups. In such a scenario, the polity is assumed as a given and integration is 
essentially about its renewal and regeneration. Conversely, it may be inferred that if 
those social and political preconditions are not entirely achieved, integration may 
hardly be regarded as the project of political and social forces in disagreement but, 
most probably, it may be the objective of external actors or internal social and 
political elites. As such, integration acquires a more authoritarian flavour since it 
implies an element of imposition, even if aimed at the civilisation of existing 
conflicts, the reconciliation of social and political forces, the building of a polity. 
Admittedly, the above are abstract and extreme options which only after several 
approximations could fit actual constitutional systems. On a close analysis, real 
constitutional settings reveal more of a mixed nature, since the boundary between 
spontaneity and imposition is often blurred. However, characterisation is not meant 
to draw borderlines, but rather to focus a discussion on integration that in this as in 
other aspects may greatly benefit from Smend’s intellectual contribution and its 
theoretical implications. 
To be sure, Smend’s constitutional approach cannot be plainly applied to the context 
of European integration. A number of its elements and underlying assumptions 
hardly fit with the reality of the latter. Just to list the most evident amongst them, it 
can be remembered that Smend explicitly resists the idea of conceiving of the 
constitution as the higher law,49 that the process of integration is assumed as taking 
place within a single and unified legal order,50 and that its purpose is defined as 
essentially self-referential, i.e. it is not meant to achieve objectives other than 
integration itself.51 However, if such aspects may justify a word of caution prior to 
embracing Smend’s theoretical framework, they do not seem to rule out the 
possibility of its critical adoption. His theory of integration, with appropriate 
                                                        
49 Smend, cit., 152. 
50 Smend, cit., 110-111. 
51 Smend, cit., 76, 99 and 158. 
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specifications and refinements, may reveal a fertile ground of investigation to 
account for a variety of aspects associated with the reality of economic and social 
conflicts in contemporary Europe. 
Modes of integration are certainly a first and rather evident terrain to test the 
explanatory dividend of Smend’s approach. Personal, functional and material 
integration, in fact, appear as useful indicators for unravelling and comparing the 
type of integration pursued by the EU and its member states as responses to first and 
second type conflicts.52 Of course, all of them require some specification and 
adjustment in light of the characteristics of contemporary constitutional reality.  
Personal integration, for instance, is probably the field where Smend’s theory needs 
the most incisive overhaul and update. It was previously observed that personal 
integration refers to the representation of the unity of the polity and the maintenance 
of its fundamental legal convictions. In this regard, one must concede that nowadays 
in most of the constitutional systems the unity of the polity is no longer or only 
putatively embodied by the monarchy or the bureaucracy. Indeed, the rise of 
constitutional democracies overshadowed the unifying role of the latter, and shifted 
the task of representing and codifying the unity of the polity to the authors of the 
constitution (pouvoir constituant). Moreover, the context of European integration 
invites a more articulate account of personal integration as to the nature and 
composition of the polity. Smend’s theory assumes a polity conceived of in only 
nation-like terms. By contrast, European integration unfolds in a multidimensional 
context which calls for a more articulate frame of analysis. Investigation on personal 
integration, in fact, requires further specification as to the nature of the subjects 
involved in the processes of integration at national and supranational level, and the 
qualification of their relationships with the respective constitutions as texts and 
living documents. In fact, modifications in the nature of the polity may also bring 
about the redefinition of the fundamental legal convictions of the constitutional 
frameworks at issue, a field determined by a broader set of elements such as the type 
                                                        
52 This resonates Smend’s idea of connecting types of integration and theory of forms of state, see 
Smend, cit., 99 and 182. 
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of conflict, the constitutional objectives and, eventually, the attitudes towards the 
existing distributions of economic resources. 
The adoption of Smend’s theory is more straightforward in relation to material 
integration. Here, almost no specification is needed since Smend’s account is already 
aware of the integrative potential inherent in substantive principles and 
constitutional adjudication.53 The difference may be only one of degree since in 
current legal systems constitutional populism and identification of the polity with 
unitary symbols once associated with institutions such as the Reichpräsident have 
increasingly migrated to constitutional rules and constitutional courts54 – a process 
that to some extent Smend himself notes in his description of the declining role of the 
monarchy on behalf of values and fundamental rights.55 
Finally, the extent to which Smend’s notion of functional integration must be refined 
is also minimal. Here, formation of political will may still be regarded as the main 
form of collective life.  Yet, parliamentary democracy being only one of the possible 
patterns of decision-making, investigation must include a more sophisticated 
account of the institutions and procedures currently involved in policy-making. 
Moreover, the fact that in most constitutional frameworks substantive principles 
have been entrenched justifies an enquiry into the scope for political decision-
making. 
Apart from the modes of integration, insight into Smend’s theoretical thought may 
be productive in further and less obvious dimensions. Firstly, his concept of 
integration and its inherent circularity alert us to be wary of static representations of 
legal systems, mechanical explanations of their relationships and the search of 
Archimedean points. Indeed, if integration is really about constant renewal, 
regeneration and mutual identification, the accounts of constitutional systems and 
their interactions should give a sense of their stratified nature and reciprocal 
                                                        
53 Smend, cit., 218. 
54 C. Möllers, ‘‘We are (afraid of) the people’: Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism’, in 
M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism – Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form (OUP, 2007), 96. 
55 Smend, cit., 113, 183 and 241-248. 
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hybridisation.56 Smend’s general notion of integration, then, may provoke questions 
on the effective dynamic of the interactions between the constitutional frameworks at 
issue. It may be asked, indeed, whether third type conflicts generate processes of 
oscillation and mutual identification between entities which remain distinct or, on 
the contrary, if they are best conceptualised as moments of a unitary process of 
dialectic coordination. Finally, Smend’s call to focus constitutional theory on 
structures rather than on conflicts of values suggests that the reconstruction of 
Europe’s current constitutional reason should not immediately be interpreted as an 
exercise of morality and, namely, that in analytical terms the choice between statist 
or supranational constitutional ideology and epistemology may be misleading. This, 
of course, does not rule out the value of normative considerations which may be 
used at a later stage for a critique of the undergoing processes. 
 
3.  Integration as Europe’s Constitutional Reason 
3.1. Integration within the constitutional frameworks 
Frequently, in accounting for phenomena of stratification (or, similarly, of identity 
formation), analysis of the oldest geological sections may prove illuminating.57 
Arguably, also investigation on the distinctive features of Europe’s constitutional 
frameworks may greatly benefit from considerations on their genetic moments as it 
is often at that evolutionary stage that the main identity traits are shaped. In this 
view, the first step of this comparative survey describes how the member states and 
EEC legal systems have initially responded to first and second type conflicts. The 
focus, therefore, is on the original traits of states’ common constitutional traditions58 
                                                        
56 On stratification and its explanatory potential see J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Geology of International 
Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Heidelberg Journal of International 
Law, 10. 
57 P. W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), 42-43. 
58 Construction of common constitutional tradition will not reflect the methodology usually 
employed by the Court of Justice in interpreting articles 6 EU or 288 EC. For the aim here is 
analytical and not operational, national law is not regarded as offering solutions meeting EU’s 
functional concerns (see, for instance, Opinion AG Maduro in Joined Cases 120/06 P and 121/06 
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and the pre-SEA Community legal framework. At this stage analysis approaches 
legal systems as in mutual isolation and highlights both their inherent values and 
biases. By doing so, the defining features of the competing cognitive models of 
conflict and integration currently confronting in Europe are spelled out. 
 
Personal integration 
Previous analysis has already pointed out first type conflicts (i.e. conflicts associated 
with class struggles) as the main factor of potential disintegration and, therefore, the 
central concern of states’ constitutionalism. Admittedly, national constitutions 
revolve around a broader set of contentious issues: gender, local self-government, 
religion, languages are only a few of the possible sources of conflict included in the 
projects of integration of states’ polities. Still, in establishing new constitutional 
regimes in the aftermath of World War II the economic and social divide proved to 
be a major catalyst. Not only were the political identities of the authors of the new 
constitutions largely defined along those lines, but also much of the legal tradition 
associated with constitutional democracy owed a great debt to intellectual 
contributions conceived of in the backdrop of first type conflicts. The prominence of 
the latter was such that political divisions and constitutional responses to other and 
more remote sources of disintegration often ended up reflecting categories and 
approaches originally devised in respect to economic and social cleavages. 
Economic and social cohesion may be regarded as the objective inspiring the general 
strategy of integration pursued within the member states. Its contents and 
constitutional implications are largely an application of the canons of republican 
constitutional democracy to the field of first type conflicts. In this view, the 
recognition of the nature of the polity emerges as a first crucial element. Promotion 
of economic and social cohesion, indeed, presupposes the definition of the subjects of 
                                                                                                                                                               
P, Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) and Others v Council and 
Commission and Giorgio Fedon & Figli SpA and Others v Concil and Commission, not yet reported). 
On the contrary, the attempt is identifying, with the inevitable degree of approximation, those 
traits in which the majority of national constitutional systems converge and which, as such, may 
be considered as symptomatic of states’ constitutional nature.  
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integration, which national constitutions identify primarily in the citizens. In the 
light of the newly acquired republican ethos, citizenship is broadly defined in both 
scope and entitlements. As to the former, previous gender, social and race 
discriminations are expressly ruled out. As to the latter, political rights are 
acknowledged as both individual and collective entitlements – a feature that makes 
citizens fully-fledged actors of socialisation.59 
In this regard, the most dramatic manifestation of citizenship is probably the exercise 
of constituent power. Newly enacted constitutions are commonly legitimised by the 
rhetoric – and, in many cases, also by the practice – of the sovereignty of the people 
expressed either directly through referendum60 or as the political compromise 
between the main political forces.61 The symbolic meaning of such dignified 
discourse could hardly be overstated since the emerging emphatic republican 
conception of constituent power62 marks the shift between two radically opposing 
forms of personal integration. While in the authoritarian regimes prior to World War 
II personal integration occurred mainly in populist plebiscites, in the newly 
established constitutional democracies the unification of the polity is the object of a 
circuit of consensus politics associated with the making of entrenched constitutions.63 
In this view, previous political clashes for the establishment of general political 
decisions as the contents of constitutional rules are transformed into more civilised 
conflicts within the constitution for the interpretation of its shared norms.64 
The treatment of first type conflicts results in a clear concretisation of such a general 
approach. National constitutional traditions converge on certain fundamental legal 
convictions concerning the promotion of robust civic bonds amongst their citizens 
which inspire systems of solidarity whose main components are progressive 
                                                        
59 On the characteristics of modern citizenship, see R. Bellamy, ‘Introduction – The Making of 
Modern Citizenship’ in R. Bellamy, D. Castiglione, E. Santoro (eds), Lineages of European 
Citizenship: Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven Nation States (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), 1. 
60 See, for an example, the approval of the French Constitution in 1958. 
61 The Italian and Spanish cases may be examples in this regard. For a classification of the process 
of constitution-making, see M. Rosenfeld, The problem of “identity” in Constitution-making and 
constitutional reform, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper, 143/2005. 
62 Kumm, Beyond Golf Clubs, 509. 
63 G. Zagrebelsky, ‘La Corte in-politica’ (2005) Quaderni Costituzionali, 273. 
64 See below in this subsection on material integration. 
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taxation, proactive industrial policy and universal entitlement to social rights or 
services. Yet the attitude of the constitutions towards the existing distributions of 
resources is framed only in open-ended terms. Indeed, the degree of status quo 
conservation or redistribution is not decided by constitutional norms, but it is 
conceived of as a vector resulting from electoral majoritarian politics and 
constitutional interpretation by principled institutions. 
Second type conflicts, on the other hand, constitute the baseline of the EEC strategy 
of integration. In this view, the main factors of concern are associated with the 
mobility of factors of production and regulatory competition between member states. 
Disintegration, therefore, can result from member states’ protectionism, another of 
the sources of uneasiness and tension that had notoriously featured in Europe’s 
history prior to World War II. Even second type conflicts turn out to be a catalyst for 
integration within the Community. Their centrality, nevertheless, is far less obvious a 
matter than that of first type conflicts in national constitutionalism. The pivotal role 
of economic integration, in fact, is equally the result of a successful regulatory 
strategy pursued in crucial substantive areas, and of the failure of other efforts of 
international cooperation at the European level attempted in similarly decisive 
sectors such as defence or foreign policy. 
The Community response to second type conflicts is the common market project. 
Initially presented as a limited regulatory programme, the common market has 
embodied for a long time a far more ambitious strategy aiming at the transformation 
of states’ political communities and, ultimately, at the integration of the peoples of 
Europe.65 It is not for this article to rehearse the evolutionary trajectories and the 
consolidation of that process.66 Suffice for our purposes to note that the common 
market project has ushered in an epistemological redefinition of the original 
                                                        
65 This emerges especially from the Schumann declaration and the preamble to the EEC treaty. 
For an account of integration as originally a function of the common market project, see D. 
Chalmers, ‘The Single Market: From Prima Donna to Journeyman’, in J. Shaw and G. More (eds), 
New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon Press, 1995), 55. 
66 The classic in this regard is J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (CUP, 1999). 
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international law framework of the common market project67 and, critically, the 
building of a polity composed of member states and individuals.68 Yet the degree of 
participation in policy-making by the subjects of integration varies in scope and 
entitlements. Originally, only member states enjoyed full standing in deciding the 
contents of Community policies, while the status of individuals was limited both in 
scope and entitlements. For the purposes of economic integration, in fact, only 
market actors, although broadly defined, could vaunt some legal status in the 
emerging Community. Moreover, the entitlements of individuals originally consisted 
of participatory rights in the Community administration and judiciary. In the 
absence of political rights, acknowledged only in subsequent phases, individuals 
could appear essentially as beneficiaries of an already defined programme of 
economic integration. Indeed, neither the regulatory patterns nor the formation of 
the common market project met the republican credentials of state constitutionalism. 
Incorporated in international treaties, the constitutional provisions establishing the 
principles of economic integration were still a reflection of consensus politics but, 
critically, of an intergovernmental type.69 Conceived of in this way, personal 
integration could hardly satisfy the urge for individuals’ involvement and 
participation underpinning the republican conception of the constituent power. 70 
The composition of the polity and the octroyée constitutional nature of the common 
market design71 are not the only aspects contrasting with the state constitutional 
template. True, as in national constitutional settings and first type conflicts, also the 
common market project provides norms that may civilise second type conflicts. Yet 
                                                        
67 M. Maduro, ‘The importance of being called a constitution: Constitutional authority and the 
authority of constitutionalism’, (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 336. The link 
between the common market project and the normative and constitutional qualities of EC law is 
underlined in Chalmers, From Prima Donna to Journeyman, p. 60. 
68 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlande Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR I-1. 
69 In this, it may be argued that treaty-making in the Community conforms with the standards of 
constitution-making in federal legal orders, see J. Baquero Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-
Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’, (2008) 14 European Law Journal, 409. 
70 Kumm, Beyond golf clubs, 510. 
71 Of course, this excludes indirect democratic participation associated with treaty-making 
power. 
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such principles, devised under the influence of economic ordoliberal thought,72 
delineate a thick regulatory programme amounting to a general political decision 
whose implementation and interpretation invites a range of political options 
narrower than those admitted under national constitutional principles. 
Finally, the attitude of the common market project towards existing distributions 
also challenges national constitutional coordinates. Under the law of free movement, 
the Community is expected to tackle states’ regulatory failures on the basis of an 
allocative rather than distributive strategy.73 Against this background, the original 
version of the common market project avoids the establishment of demanding 
transnational civic bonds. In place of solidarity, therefore, one at most finds forms of 
assistance74 between national communities consisting in the social opportunities of 




A hallmark of state constitutionalism is the entrenchment of a composite set of 
principles, economic freedoms and social rights featuring among them. 
Entrenchment fulfils both a positive and negative function towards political 
decision-making: on the one hand constitutional principles may inspire and direct 
legislation, on the other they limit the contents of the latter and orient its 
interpretation. But if the idea of limiting political power is all-pervasive in European 
common constitutional traditions, the same cannot be said for the mechanism of 
enforcement assisting constitutional principles. Most constitutional systems couple 
the entrenchment of constitutional principles with judicial remedies.75 In this 
                                                        
72 Chalmers, From Prima Donna to Journeyman, 57. On ordoliberalism, see D. J. Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentienth Century Europe – Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press, 1998), 232-
265. 
73 Chalmers, From Prima Donna to Journeyman, 66. 
74 P. Eleftheriadis, ‘The Idea of a European Constitution’, (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 18-20.  
75 Arguably, also the United Kingdom, despite its flexible constitution: see Human Rights Act 
(1998), articles 4 and 10. 
Economic and social conflicts, integration and constitutionalism 
 
22 
perspective, the constraining power of higher norms is associated with judicial 
review of legislation, a function that member states arrange in a variety of ways 
ranging from scrutiny by constitutional or ordinary courts within their domestic 
legal orders to, arguably, external review entrusted to international courts.76 Through 
constitutional justice, material integration starts from where constitution-making and 
personal integration ended. Interpretation of constitutional norms, indeed, activates 
processes of constant renewal and regeneration of meaning, a function that not only 
enhances the integrative potential of substantive principles, but also bridges personal 
and functional integration. 
The latter role emerges clearly if the relationships between legislation and 
constitutional principles are analysed. As mentioned, substantive principles in 
national constitutions are often structured as constitutive principles, i.e. their 
prescriptive content is defined only in broad terms.77 The constitutional significance 
of this feature has been already underlined in dealing with personal integration. At 
this stage, an important annotation from Smend may perhaps be added. In 
describing material integration and the integrative potential of symbols, Smend 
observes that such textual paucity – a legacy from archaic societies and their broad 
homogeneity of values – maintains in contemporary pluralist societies a powerful 
role insofar as it simultaneously expresses a shared value while allowing for its 
different interpretations.78 
The open-ended texture of constitutive principles brings about two important 
implications as to their relationship with legislation. Firstly, whereas constitutional 
principles are meant to direct legislative interpretation, also the opposite often 
occurs. Notably, in filling the contents of constitutional principles, it is common for 
judges or constitutional courts to specify them in the light of the more precise 
                                                        
76 Economic freedom may find protection at the European Court of Human Rights (article 1 of 
Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). 
Respect of social rights enshrined in the European Social Charter is monitored by a Committee of 
Independent Experts (article 24(2) European Social Charter). 
77 On the distinction between constitutive and regulatory principles see Gerber, cit., 248-249. 
78 Smend, cit., 103. 
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indications contained in legislative norms.79 Secondly, due to their structure, 
constitutive principles are handled in constitutional justice within the framework of 
the principle of proportionality.80 In adjudicating on legislation on economic issues, 
national constitutional traditions converge on the application of ‘rationality test’,81 
the most deferential of the standards of judicial review. In this test, courts avoid 
scrutiny on the public objectives pursued in legislation, and require only a minimal 
degree of coherence between those ends and legislative provisions.82 Consequently, 
within member states existing distributions are not entitled to any special protection 
towards majoritarian decision-making. In this field, indeed, constitutional courts 
play essentially the marginal and defensive role83 of safeguarding the minimum 
contents of both economic freedoms and social rights.84 
In the Community legal framework, material integration of member states and 
market actors takes place in the interpretation of a more articulate set of principles. 
To be sure, also the common market project includes constitutive principles.85 Yet 
material integration occurs mostly in respect of more specific regulatory principles, 
conceived of as default provisions whose application can always be ruled out or 
narrowed down by Community measures of respectively total or partial 
harmonisation.86 Entrenched in the founding treaties, both categories of principles 
are operated through a system of enforcement including a prosecutorial 
infringement procedure assigned to the Commission and a judiciary organised 
around the Court of Justice and national courts.  
Whereas constitutive principles perform an essentially symbolic function,87 
regulatory principles may be regarded as the backbone of the common market 
                                                        
79 R. Bin, Diritti e argomenti (Giuffrè, 1992), 18-30. 
80 On the structure of the principle of proportionality, see R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional 
Rights (OUP, 2002), 394-414. 
81 T. Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions (CUP, 2003), 249-250. 
82 C. R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard University Press, 1993), 29. 
83 Bin, Diritti e argomenti, 157-159. 
84 Möllers, cit., 104. 
85 See, for example, articles 2 and 14 EC. 
86 See, for example, articles 28 and 43 EC. 
87 On the lack of independent regulatory effects of articles 2 and 14, see, respectively, Case 
126/86, Fernando Roberto Gimenez Zaera v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social e Tesoreria 
General de la Seguridad Social [1987] ECR I-3697 and Case 378/97, Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-
6207. 
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project. They apply mostly to member states’ measures with cross-border effects,88 
and their contents challenge the canonical distinction between rules and principles.89 
Indeed, their structure, repeated with specific adjustments in all substantive areas 
included in the common market project, consists at first of a prima facie prohibition, 
shaped either in relative or absolute terms90 depending, respectively, on the existence 
or not of an equal treatment requirement.91 In this respect, the content of regulatory 
principles is clearly defined and it is structurally similar to that of rules. Yet the 
deregulatory impact of prima facie prohibitions, apart from being ruled out by 
harmonisation, is normally92 mitigated by specific derogations foreseen in the 
treaty.93 Such grounds for justification bring in proportionality review of states’ 
measures. In this respect, the scrutiny of the Court of Justice follows stricter 
standards than the rationality test employed by national courts. Notably, in 
adjudicating on states’ measures, the Court assesses their congruity94 as to their 
alleged objectives as well as the absence of any disguised protectionist intent.95 At 
that point, it may go on and adopt an ‘equivalence balance test’ in order to ascertain 
whether the level of protection of non-market values established by domestic 
legislation can be achieved through a lesser burdensome measure.96 In certain cases97 
it may even opt for a ‘pure balance test’, one where a less burdensome measure may 
                                                        
88 See Case 180/83, Hans Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] ECR 2539 and Case 64/96, 
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR 
I-3171. The need of a cross-border element was questioned in Joined Cases 321-324/94, Jacques 
Pistre [1997] ECR I-2343. 
89 On which see Alexy, cit., 47-48. 
90 Examples of absolute prohibition may be Case 76/90, Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221 
and Case 55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR 
I-4165. Examples of relative prohibition may be Case 170/78, Commission v United Kingdom 
[1980] ECR 417 and Case 274/96, Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637. 
91 On the blurred boundaries between absolute and relative prohibitions see G. de Búrca, 
‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EC and International Trade law’, in C. Barnard and J. 
Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market – Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 
2002), 181. 
92 In certain cases derogations are not explicitly foreseen: see articles 25 and 90 EC. 
93 For a strict construction of derogations to free movement of services, see Case 17/92, FDC 
[1993] ECR I-2239. 
94 Case 217/99, Commission v Belgium [2000] ECR I-10251. 
95 Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1986] ECR 1007. 
96 For applications of the equivalence balance test, see Case 188/84, Commission v. France [1986] 
ECR I-419 and Case 340/89, Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz Bundes-und 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Wurttemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. 
97 The best known application of pure balance is Case 120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fuer Branntwein [1979] ECR I-649. 
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be preferred even though it affects the level of risk decided in the measure under 
review.98 Such types of more aggressive judicial review reflect the concern for states’ 
regulatory failures inspiring the common market project. In this view, measures 
amounting to discriminations or obstacles to trade are perceived as symptoms of 
prevarication against outsiders by majoritarian groups within national jurisdictions.99 
As such, it takes for the member states to comply with demanding proportionality 
requirements to maintain such regulatory instruments. This explains why the scope 
of application of regulatory principles may be contentious:100 their remit defines not 
only the areas of competition between national (lenient) review and (aggressive) 
supranational scrutiny on national measures but, critically, the extent to which the 




Institutions and procedures involved in political will formation are the last field 
where the distinctive elements of Europe’s constitutional frameworks may be 
compared. How is political decision-making organised at a national and 
supranational level? How do the subjects of integration voice their political opinions 
and interests? 
The official answer to these questions in member states’ constitutional democracies is 
parliamentary democracy. According to a strong common constitutional tradition, 
parliaments are regarded as the main repository of democratic legitimacy and, as 
such, the most appropriate venue to integrate society in the institutional system.101 
This makes parliaments also privileged institutions for debating, mediating and 
deciding first type conflicts. In principle, therefore, functional integration in states’ 
                                                        
98 On the ‘equivalence’ and ‘pure’ balance tests see M. Poiares Maduro, We, the court – The 
European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing, 1998), 56-57. 
99 Maduro, We, the court, cit., 70 and Sunstein, cit., 32. 
100 Concerns on the reach of article 28, for instance, have notoriously emerged in the Sunday 
trading saga (see Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v B&Q plc [1989] ECR I-3851 and Case 
169/91, Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent e Norwich City Council v B&Q plc [1992] ECR I-6635).  
101 V. Onida, La Costituzione (Il Mulino, 2004), 33. 
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constitutional frameworks unfolds in the circuit associated with electoral politics, 
political party representation, parliamentary deliberation and legislation. Two 
corollaries follow from the dogma of the centrality of parliaments. Firstly, executives 
are expected simply to implement the policies devised in legislation, subject to 
parliamentary control in the form of appointment, scrutiny and censure.102 Secondly, 
political decision-making enjoys a broad scope for manoeuvre as it encounters only 
the limits established by constitutional constitutive principles. 
Beside regulatory principles, not only is political harmonisation a constitutive 
element of the common market project but, arguably, it is also its most distinctive 
feature.103 Yet the patterns for functional integration in the Community and in the 
member states remain remarkably different. In the Community legal framework, 
political decision-making is essentially a technocratic and intergovernmental matter. 
Legislative initiatives, broadly envisaged in the meetings of the European Council, 
are formulated in more detailed terms by the Commission, an executive body 
entrusted with the task of ensuring the proper functioning and development of the 
common market.104 Deliberation, instead, is assigned to the Council, an 
intergovernmental body where, at least under the rule of the Compromise of 
Luxembourg, responses to second type conflicts are primarily addressed along the 
centre-periphery divide. In this framework, individuals, social and political groups 
participate only indirectly in Community decision-making. Their voice, constrained 
at a domestic level when political measures impact with EEC regulatory principles, 
does not find comparable venues for expression at a supranational level. Originally, 
the Community political scene, apart from the decorative role reserved to the 
Parliamentary Assembly, is strongly occupied by the executives – institutions that, at 
least according to the republican standards for self-government, are unfit to 
represent adequately the concerns of conflicting segments of society. 
                                                        
102 A stylised representation of the parliamentary model may be found in R. Dehousse, ‘European 
Institutional Architecture After Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or Regulatory Structure?’, 
(1998) 35 Common Market Law Review, 598-599. 
103 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade’, in J. H. H. Weiler 
(ed.), The EU, The WTO and the NAFTA – Towards a Common Law of International Trade (OUP, 
2000), 214-215. 
104 Article 211 EC. 
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Finally, functional integration in the Community also differs as to the scope for 
political decision-making. In this regard, a more sceptical attitude towards the 
products of democratic deliberation and political discretion may be noted. This 
emerges not only in the inroads made by Community regulatory principles on states’ 
political discretion, but also in respect to the policy initiatives undertaken by 
Community institutions. Such an attitude is best captured by a rather emblematic 
example. In opening its White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, the 
Commission defines its legislative proposals as the “essential and logical 
consequence” of the common market commitment.105 In this view, supranational 
decision-making does not seem to be about contestation and competition between 
alternative political strategies but, on the contrary, it appears essentially to be about 
implementing an already defined programme – a feature that far from evoking 
republican ideals, recalls the idea of the total constitution.106 
 
The potential for conflict between constitutional frameworks 
Investigation into the original features of Europe’s constitutional frameworks reveals 
that their distinctive elements are the product of both the promises and biases 
inherent in their strategies of integration.107  
In the republican model inspiring member states’ common constitutional traditions, 
integration is first of all about maintaining and renovating spontaneous conditions of 
democratic interplay. In this regard, the constitution is not expected to translate in 
legal terms a specific political programme – an element that would probably be 
divisive and end up undermining political freedom and pacific coexistence between 
citizens and political groups. Quite the opposite, the constitution is conceived of as a 
compromise product of consensus politics between the main political forces whose 
                                                        
105 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council 
(Milan, 28-29 June 1985) COM(85) 310, June 1985. 
106M. Kumm, ‘Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the 
Constitutionalization of Private Law’, (2006) 7 German Law Journal, 344. 
107 The conceptualisation of the following strategies of integration builds upon Zagrebelsky’s 
distinction between liberty- and justice-oriented conceptions of human rights. See Zagrebelsky, 
Diritto mite, 99-114. 
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objectives are the recognition of first type conflicts and the entrenchment of an open 
legal framework for political participation and competition.108 As a consequence, the 
constitution provides rules and institutions – especially those of parliamentary 
democracy – to discipline and facilitate political inclusion and deliberation. Political 
will formation is re-enforced by constitutional substantive principles on economic 
and social rights regarded as preconditions for effective political association and as 
ultimate constraints against the most egregious deviations of parliamentary decision-
making. 
As previously observed, in this strategy of integration policy-making may easily be 
diverted towards the interests of majoritarian political groups or influential 
economic and social players. Such naked preferences,109 apart from their domestic 
negative effects, may be detrimental to the outsiders of the polity and, as such, 
constitute an evident threat to the idea of building a supranational polity. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the objective of taming the potential for abuse inherent in 
states’ constitutional frameworks is at the centre of the Community strategy of 
integration.110 In this view, the common market project, far from establishing an open 
constitutional framework for democratic deliberation, detaches regulatory policy not 
only from the member states but, critically, from the statist constitutional 
framework.111 Integration in that context is conceived of as a programme of 
transformation of given conditions spelled out in constitutional regulatory 
principles, and entrusted to mostly intergovernmental institutions and procedures.  
Nevertheless, in both of its constitutive elements the common market project reveals 
its own constitutional bias. In decision-making, only member states have clout in the 
definition of political objectives whereas the voice of other political and social 
players is relegated to interstitial spaces for political deliberation. Moreover, 
                                                        
108 V. Onida, ‘Le Costituzioni. I principi fondamentali della costituzione italiana’, in G. Amato, A. 
Barbera (eds), Manuale di diritto pubblico (Il Mulino, 1997), 107. 
109 In the words of Sunstein, cit., 25, a naked preferences is “the distribution of resources and 
opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have 
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want”. 
110 An analogous constitutional profile is described by Majone, cit., 18. 
111 D. Chalmers, ‘Political Rights and Political Reason in European Union Law in Times of Stress’, 
in W. Sadurski (ed), Political Rights under Stress in 21st Century Europe (OUP, 2006), 57-58. 
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consensus policy-making is subject to the veto power of states’ governments – an 
element at the origin of a prolonged political stagnation112 supplemented only by the 
activism of the judiciary.113 But even in this regard biases may easily be identified. 
Admittedly, the circuit of material integration associated with treaty interpretation 
and judicial enforcement has given rise to a community of political and social players 
involved in the European judicial process.114 Yet courts are far from being neutral 
venues and, as noted, enforcement of regulatory principles has been dominated by 
repeat players and special interests.115 In such overall scenario, the common market 
appears as a particularly critical project for individuals: engaged indirectly and 
unevenly in the political and judicial implementation of a pre-defined project, they 
turn out to be treated more as objects than subjects of socialisation.  
In its original version, therefore, the Community may well appear as an “enlightened 
form of benevolent authoritarianism”.116 Yet the identification of biases in the 
supranational strategy of integration should not automatically lead one to set 
republican constitutional democracy as the desirable constitutional standard for the 
Community constitutional framework. Republican constitutional democracy defines 
an ideological and epistemological status quo whose neutrality may also be 
questioned. The fact that it is not neutral provides no argument against it, but it 
simply suggests that it is open to critical discussion.117 The common market project 
may be regarded as performing precisely this role, particularly when it seems to 
profane many of the defining aspects of the statist common constitutional traditions. 
It is against such a background that the collisions emerging in the original 
constitutional narratives of the Community and its member states must be 
conceptualised. Their uneasy interactions only superficially are a matter of ultimate 
                                                        
112 But also of the expansion of Community competences, see Weiler, Constitution of Europe, 39-
63. 
113 See Case 2/74, Reyners v Belgian State [1974] ECR 631. On the effective capacity of courts to 
bring about social reform, see the sceptical observations in Sunstein, cit., 146-147. 
114 M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. 
Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003), 511-512. 
115 Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, 518. 
116 A. Follesdal and S. Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone 
and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies, 534. 
117 The argument on status quo neutrality is borrowed from Sunstein, cit., particularly at 59. 
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authority, but they relate to more profound identity traits associated with their 
distinctive constitutive functions. In Sunstein’s language, it might be argued that 
contemporary Europe witnesses the interaction between “partial constitution(s)”. At 
the horizon there is not a unitary, hegemonic and neutral cognitive model for 
constitutional organisation which may absorb or resolve the ensuing tensions. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that such a high potential for conflict is feared as a 
source of possible disintegration. 
 
3.2. Integration between constitutional frameworks 
In arguing his claim for Europe’s Christian self-understanding, Joseph Weiler has 
observed that the historical prevalence of Christian influence in Europe produced 
what he calls a “sophisticated dialectic effect”:118 conceived of in opposition to 
Christian art, even profane art is indissolubly bound to that dominant paradigm and, 
as such, it is incomprehensible outside that context. To a certain extent, a similar 
pattern of identity formation echoes the underlying structure of supranationalism119 
and, as such, it may explain the relationship between the Community constitutional 
framework and national common constitutional traditions. In many relevant aspects 
the common market project opposes the conventional paradigm of republican 
constitutionalism. Yet it is in respect to the latter standard that the strategy of 
integration of the former finds its most persuasive justification. Indeed, many of the 
arguments put forward in subsection 1 point to the profane nature of the 
Community legal framework, a thesis that far from remaining confined to the genetic 
moments of identity formation might also teach us something as to the possible 
patterns of interaction between the EU and its member states. In this view, 
opposition does not seem ineluctably destined to disintegration. Quite on the 
contrary, the tension between our partial constitutions may be the source of a more 
                                                        
118 J. H. H. Weiler, Un’Europa Cristiana – Un saggio esplorativo (BUR, 2003), 51. 
119 Weiler, Constitution of Europe, 251. 
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sophisticated dialectic effect possibly leading to mutual identification and, arguably, 
to a coherent settlement of Europe’s constitutional orders.120 
With this in mind, this subsection reassesses the indicators previously considered in 
order to account for the mutual identification and accommodation of the national 
and supranational constitutional frameworks. At this stage analysis digs into more 
recent strata of their evolutionary process, a material that provides more realistic 
images of the legal orders at issue and may contribute to a more relaxed 
interpretation of their interaction. 
 
Personal integration 
The period following the adoption of the Single European Act and, most 
importantly, the Treaty of Maastricht is one of remarkable constitutional activism in 
Europe. In the EU not only have the original treaties been repeatedly subject to 
extensive amendment121 but outspoken constitutional discourses echoing the tones of 
republican constitutionalism have also recently entered (and, perhaps, already 
abandoned) the scene. Quite similarly, national constitutions have undergone 
amendments as to EU membership and participation. But have these changes 
deflected EU and national constitutionalism from their constitutive objectives and 
fundamental legal convictions? Can we still claim that first and second type conflicts 
remain the central concerns of their strategies of personal integration? In other 
words, are more recent constitutional discourses only decorative or do they entail a 
degree or even a complete reconfiguration of the original constitutional identities? 
Apart from their inherent symbolic message, innovations associated to amendments 
of national constitutions may be appreciated in at least three concrete dimensions. 
                                                        
120 It could be argued that the interaction between Europe’s constitutional frameworks is even 
more sophisticated than in Weiler’s excerpt: it will be shown not only how the profane entity (the 
EU) opposes states’ more orthodox constitutional paradigm, but also how orthodoxy (national 
constitutional traditions) may evolve in the light of the claims of the profane entity. 
121 B. de Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-
Permanent Treaty Revision Process’, in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Convergence 
and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart Publishing, 2002), 39. 
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Firstly, by entrenching European integration clauses in their constitutions, national 
main political forces seem to rule out EU membership from the domain of issues 
open to ordinary political competition. Disputes and contestation may arise as to the 
implementation of EU policies or even later treaty amendments. But at least from a 
formal standpoint, the participation in the processes of European integration and, 
crucially, the interaction with an alternative strategy of integration become by and 
large a states’ common constitutional tradition.122 Secondly, the codification of 
specific integration clauses implies recognition of the distinctiveness of the EU 
project from other forms of international cooperation and introduces specific rules of 
engagement in its regard. Finally, European integration clauses invite discussion as 
to the strength of the ideology and epistemology embedded in national 
constitutional frameworks and, notably, as to the relationships between their strategy 
of integration and that of the EU. Debates on the contents of the ‘economic 
constitution’ find their way into many political and intellectual environments. In 
arguing for a sort of bottom-up incorporation of the common market ethos, their 
proponents suggest that national constitutional frameworks should be re-oriented 
towards standards of economic efficiency, a move implying if not a repudiation at 
least an implicit reconsideration of states’ original constitutional attitude towards 
first type conflicts.123 
On this point, treaty amendments reshape in more articulated terms the original 
Community legal framework. Particularly after Maastricht, fragmentation appears as 
the main structural feature of the renewed EU legal order.124 Integration no longer 
may be equated to the common market project since in the new context the latter is 
regarded as just the first among equals in a whole series of other objectives.125 
Paradoxically, newly inserted flanking policies and non-economic principles prompt 
                                                        
122 A comparative analysis of European integration clauses is offered in F. Palermo, La forma di 
stato dell’Unione Europea – Per una teoria costituzionale dell’integrazione sovranazionale (Cedam, 
2006), 157-194. 
123 G. Bognetti, La costituzione economica italiana (Giuffrè, 1995). 
124 D. Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: a Europe of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 
Common Market Law Review, 17. 
125 Chalmers, From Prima Donna to Journeyman, 68. 
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a process of redefinition of the contents of the common market project, a trend that 
distances it from neoliberal models and enhances its social connotation.126 
Recalibration of the EU constitutional framework involves a broader range of 
strategies aiming at incorporating in the supranational sphere elements of states’ 
republican constitutionalism. Fundamental rights are a first clear sign of this trend. 
The judicial development and, then, the codification of a catalogue of rights do not 
simply reflect the idea of grounding EU policy-making on more visible substantive 
bases.127 In particular the Charter of Nice conveys the idea of a rather definite 
integrative vocation associated with fundamental rights,128 a constitutive ambition 
that at least in symbolic terms contests second type conflicts and market integration 
as the main concerns of the EU, and envisages first type conflicts and republican 
constitutionalism as the new EU frontier.129 
In a way, incorporation of fundamental rights discourse is paralleled by a more 
inclusive definition of the EU polity. The introduction of EU citizenship means the 
enfranchisement in the law of free movement of a broader set of individuals than 
market actors.130 Citizens gain EU status regardless of their economic qualifications 
and their rights and duties extend to areas which are far beyond the scope of 
common market provisions. Even within the domain of the common market, their 
protection seems to have lost the original economic character. Not only do 
citizenship provisions induce considerable redefinition of previous regulatory 
strategies in the field of free movement of persons,131 but in a number of cases market 
                                                        
126 Chalmers, From Prima Donna to Journeyman, 63-65. 
127 Compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Commission legislative proposals – 
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128 R. Toniatti, ‘Verso la definizione dei “valori superiori”dell’ordinamento comunitario: il 
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129 J. Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ (2001) New Left Review, 17. 
130 See Case 85/96, María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691 and article 24(1) of 
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freedoms are stretched to the extent of appearing themselves as functions of 
fundamental rights protection rather than the opposite.132 
In such an overall effort to recalibrate the EU strategy of personal integration 
towards more conventional constitutional coordinates the missing element is 
constituent power. In this respect events associated with the Constitutional Treaty 
and the French and Dutch referenda sound like an extremely telling lesson as to that 
ambition and its effective deliverance when transplanted in the EU. Indeed, the idea 
of imparting bottom-up constitutional legitimacy to the EU constitutional 
framework133 has inspired a process which has only aped emphatic republican 
constituent power – an attempt that has notoriously been debunked by more genuine 
manifestations of national popular will.  
This teaches us that processes of mutual identification and accommodation between 
Europe’s constitutional orders, though certainly significant, are not limitless and 
uncontroversial. Other elements in the strategies of redefinition of the patterns of 
personal integration described above confirm such a more sophisticated trend. 
Constitutional amendments, for instance, can hardly be regarded as innovations in 
the strategies of integration of Europe’s constitutional frameworks. In member states, 
the discourse on the economic constitution, however relevant for the interpretation 
of economic freedoms and social rights, by no means has removed national 
constitutionalism from its commitment towards economic and social cohesion. 
Similar arguments may be proffered as to the evolution of the EU forms of personal 
integration. The democratic aura surrounding the Charter of Nice and the 
Constitutional Treaty suddenly dissolves when contrasted with the 
intergovernmental logic underpinning respectively their non binding nature and 
ratification procedure.134 Despite all the rhetorical efforts, the EU remains a highly 
divided polity where not only do the preconditions for an emphatic republican 
                                                        
132 Case 60/00, Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279. 
133 Lenaerts and Gerard, cit., 322. 
134 It could be argued that the procedure of adoption and the legal nature of both the Charter of 
Nice and the Constitutional Treaty confirm the theory whereby “the harder the law the harder 
the law making” (Weiler, Constitution of Europe, 34): whereas the lack of voice of member states’ 
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exercise of constituent power seem absent but where also a serious commitment to 
solidarity appears misplaced.  
Both the substantive and procedural attempts to revise in republican terms the EU 
constitutional framework leave largely unaffected this reality and the original 
strategy of integration associated with it.135 The common market project, although 
profoundly revised in its contents by treaty amendments and flanking policies, 
maintains its constitutional role as evidenced not only in the persisting absence of an 
EU general taxing and spending power,136 but also in many of the EU non-economic 
policies whose very concern seems the protection of the market society.137 Even 
progress made on citizenship at a closer look reveals traces which go back to the 
original instrumental approach to individuals by the Community.138 Take, for 
instance, the residence requirements established in the directive on the free 
movement of citizens139 and the cases concerning persons who cannot fulfil them and 
a clear discrepancy with the civic bonds inbuilt in national citizenship will suddenly 
reappear.140 
This should not lead to the conclusion that discourses perform only a bad faith 
placatory function towards the discontents of each constitutional framework. A 
number of elements show that mutual identification and accommodation at the level 
of personal integration between states’ and EU constitutional frameworks are 
processes underway which have prompted more profound elements of convergence 
in their respective fundamental legal convictions. Without doubt, analysis reveals 
also that distinctive elements persist with all their potential for conflict. Yet 
interactions seem to evolve in a climate of substantial awareness of the functional 
and substantive claims endorsed in each constitutional framework, a crucial 
precondition that discourses have certainly helped to thrive. 
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137 Chalmers, Political rights and political reason, 66. 
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The previous account for the evolution of personal integration has already shown 
how discourses on fundamental rights and market principles have been used in 
Europe’s constitutional frameworks to re-orient original identities. Analysis has also 
revealed that despite these attempts, the original commitments to economic and 
social cohesion and market integration have not been deflected but only revised. This 
sets the context also for the evolution of material integration: market regulatory 
principles and economic and social rights, far from superseding each other, maintain 
their grip on their respective constitutional frameworks and continue to perform 
their function of material integration. Nonetheless, even in this regard mutual 
identification and accommodation have brought about a degree of reconsideration of 
the original identity traits – a phenomenon that is in line with the convergent trends 
of personal integration. 
In national constitutional adjudication economic and social rights, regardless of the 
claims of the proponents of the economic constitution, continue to play their original 
defensive role vis-à-vis legislation. Constitutional courts maintain a deferent stance 
and if market considerations surface in their judgements, most of the time this occurs 
because the relevant legislation has incorporated them. Similarly, deregulatory 
outcomes in constitutional adjudication are far from being the result of stricter 
standards of judicial review. In many of these cases, in fact, constitutional courts 
attain these solutions at the end of litigation on the side-effects of supranational 
adjudication. Cases on reverse discriminations are emblematic in this regard. Finally, 
also more cautious approaches to the protection of social rights hardly qualify as 
products of pro-market judicial activism. Reconsideration of the standards of social 
protection, indeed, are often just an indirect reflection of the EU constraints on 
national budgets conveyed by national legislation, or of a more disciplined 
interpretation of constitutional norms. 
The increasing relaxation and, to some extent, the marginalisation of market 
regulatory principles are the main convergent traits of the EU strategy of material 
integration. Many factors contribute to this phenomenon. The first and, probably, 
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most important element is the shift to qualified majority voting introduced by the 
SEA. This institutional reform, in promoting an exponential increase in the adoption 
of measures of positive harmonisation, implies as a consequence a substantial 
reduction of the field of application of free movement treaty rules. A more cautious 
approach, then, is endorsed also in the judiciary where the Court of Justice has 
revised its standards of review on national regulatory measures. Keck141 and its 
progeny reflect not only the rejection of the idea of using market principles as 
economic due process clauses142 but also a strategic shift from a strategy of market 
building to one of market maintenance.143 Moreover, the expansion of mandatory 
requirements well beyond the originally permitted ends broadens the grounds for 
justification of prima facie violations of the treaty.144 Yet the combination of these 
factors does not amount to a complete overturn of the original features of 
Community constitutional adjudication: not only in their redefined domain do 
market principles continue to inspire stringent scrutiny on national measures,145 but 
also positive harmonisation and national legislation find in their regulatory strategies 
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Even analysis on functional integration indicates that hybridisation in the form of 
convergence permeates the most recent strata of Europe’s constitutional frameworks.  
The rise of governments and the marginalisation of parliaments are elements that 
reveal how member states are shifting from parliamentary to executive-based modes 
of functional integration. Admittedly such trend, to some extent a product of the 
centralisation associated with the original Community executive-based policy-
making, takes place in contexts that are still profoundly informed by the rhetoric and 
structures of the constitutional democracy. Nonetheless, behind this democratic 
surface, the increased role of executives is a widespread reality that comes out in 
both electoral politics and policy-making. Originally conceived as the starting point 
for a process of functional integration hinging upon parliaments, electoral politics in 
member states is progressively more of a competition for government leadership 
than for democratic representation. Likewise, national policy-making, once 
dominated by the legislative paradigm, is extensively channelled into executive rule 
making either in the form of secondary regulation or delegated legislation.147 Overall, 
such phenomena signal the emergence alongside the more dignified circuit of 
parliamentary democracy of unmediated forms of democratic legitimisation of the 
executives – a trend that may find in the Weimar constitution and its double source 
of parliamentary and quasi-populist legitimacy a rather bleak historical antecedent.148  
The emancipation of policy-making from the original technocratic and 
intergovernmental paradigm is undoubtedly a major element of convergence of the 
EU constitutional framework towards the original statist template of constitutional 
democracy. In many ways the turning point of this process is the already mentioned 
shift to qualified majority voting introduced by the SEA. Not only has that made 
positive harmonisation the privileged instrument for dealing with second type 
conflicts, but many elements of the democratic repositioning of the EU may be traced 
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back to it. Firstly, qualified majority voting, combined with the introduction of new 
legal bases and the doctrinal legal framework created in the pre-SEA phase, expands 
the scope for EU policy-making. In this renewed context, legislative initiatives may 
by no means be considered the essential and logical consequences of any 
constitutional programme since virtually all policy objectives may be pursued at a 
supranational level. Moreover, qualified majority voting means a remarkable 
redefinition of the constitutional role of the Commission. Removal of veto powers 
allows it to interpret more convincingly its role of policy entrepreneur, a function 
that prompts the politicisation of its composition and, at a more general level, a 
comprehensive redefinition of the EU form of government. The rise of the European 
Parliament and parliamentary democracy is probably the most eloquent 
manifestation of this trend. Downgraded in national constitutional systems, 
parliamentary democracy appears to resurrect in the EU constitutional framework. 
Here, the usual story goes that the European Parliament has irresistibly evolved from 
its original consultative role to that of a fully-fledged legislative body with a 
remarkable role in policy-making and in the formation of the Commission.149 
But, again, important as they may be, the evolutionary trends should not be regarded 
as toppling the original structures of Europe’s constitutional frameworks. In other 
words, even in functional integration the evolutionary paradigm is convergence 
rather than assimilation. In states’ constitutionalism, for instance, the rise of the 
executives remains entrenched in systems in which parliamentary democracy is still 
regarded as the main source of legitimacy for political decision-making. In fact, not 
only are governments expected to obtain at least the implicit confidence of 
parliaments, but also executive rule making finds in legislation its main policy 
guidelines or, at least, legal grounding. 
Similarly, emancipation from a prevalent intergovernmental paradigm and the move 
towards democracy in the EU are processes that meet clear lines of resistance in the 
former constitutional structure of the Community legal order. At the formal level, 
convergence and resistance find a clear concretisation in the patchwork nature of the 
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EU system of governance.150 Politicisation associated with parliamentary government 
pervades only segments of an EU policy-making that, on the whole, is still largely 
marked by intergovernmental and technocratic elements. The sharp slowdown in 
legislation and increase in secondary executive law making are a clear sign in this 
regard.151 Finally, the low intensity of EU constitutionalism is confirmed in its 
persisting deficit of republican life: the fragility of electoral politics and political 
rights152 and the prevalent national dimension of civil society participation and 
mobilisation153 are eloquent factors that inhibit a claim by the EU to constitutional 
authority in a strong normative sense. 
 
Convergence as antidote to disintegration 
In a nutshell, it might be argued that interactions between Europe’s constitutional 
orders have caused a transformation of national constitutional traditions 
proportional to the democratisation of the supranational constitutional framework. It 
was far from obvious that third type conflicts could trigger a similar sophisticated 
dialectic effect. Yet competition between constitutional models could have hardly 
ended up with the prevalence of one strategy of integration and the assimilation of 
the other. Either extensive market deregulation under the cover of placatory 
constitutional discourses or a European-wide constitutional democracy seem 
unlikely solutions with a high potential for disintegration. Conversely, the absence of 
a hegemonic constitutional model turns out to be the ideal structural condition for 
the development of a pattern of interaction alternative to both conflict and 
assimilation. In previous analysis this pattern has been named convergence, a 
process that may take place within each constitutional framework and that, in this 
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decentralised perspective, stands for pursuing substantive awareness154 while 
preserving functional distinctiveness. 
The persistence of an element of tension in convergent interactions is far from 
indicating that that process is unstable or that it has not yet achieved a consolidated 
state. To the contrary, tension may be regarded as its essential characteristic155 and, 
arguably, its very engine. The distinctive natures of Europe’s constitutional 
frameworks nourish a sense of reciprocal demystification, one where the emphasis of 
one’s added value aims essentially at coming to terms with the other’s bias. In this 
view, the common market project provides the standard to highlight and counteract 
the naked preferences for insiders and the potential of abuse in national 
constitutional democracies. Likewise, republican constitutional democracy not only 
challenges the aura of political neutrality surrounding EU policy-making, but it also 
unmasks the overrepresentation of business and economic elites behind it. Starting 
from similar premises, the response to third type conflicts suggested by the pattern 
of convergence consists in a dialectic process of identity regeneration. In such 
process, each of Europe’s constitutional frameworks is expected to re-interpret its 
partial strategy of integration in the light of the counterparts’ substantive claims156 – a 
circular and continuous movement that Smend’s phenomenology of integration 
could possibly help to conceptualise. 
 
3.3. Integration across constitutional frameworks 
In recalling Smend’s critique to his contemporary constitutional scholarship, it has 
been noted how he rejected the idea of establishing any value-based hierarchies 
between state and individuals. Hierarchies, it was observed, are products of self-
referential, rigidly defined and monolithic notions of those entities. Smend claims 
that similar conceptions are highly misleading for they do no justice to the very 
                                                        
154 On mutual deference between Europe’s constitutional frameworks see M. Poiares Maduro, 
Contrapunctual law, 530. 
155 D. Halberstam, Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and 
the United States, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 111/2008, 3. 
156 On reciprocal orientation as a pattern of interaction, see N. Walker, cit., 355-356. 
Economic and social conflicts, integration and constitutionalism 
 
42 
nature of the state and individuals and to the structure of their interactions. Indeed, 
both of them evolve in a process of integration consisting in their continuous mutual 
identification. In such a process there is no point of rest and, as a result, any attempt 
to establish normative priorities between them is illusory. 
In a number of ways, the structure of the interactions between Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks happens to reflect Smend’s notion of integration. As 
documented, no persuasive structural hierarchy can be established between the 
strategies of integration pursued by the EU and its member states’. Moreover, 
interactions between them not only may result in a constant process of mutual 
identification and accommodation, but they also trace a circular and oscillating 
movement where, critically, no Archimedean point can be identified.  
Yet other aspects in Smend’s theory may be more problematic. In his notion, for 
instance, integration is about the creation of a unified and coherent body.157 Indeed, 
in developing his theory Smend has in mind the scenario of the federal state, an 
entity that in his conception encompasses the central state and the member states 
regarded as moments of a unitary process of dialectic coordination.158 Does a similar 
formula describe the interactions between Europe’s constitutional frameworks? Is it 
accurate to claim that what we have currently in Europe is a process of integration 
where the EU and the member states are moments of a unitary process of dialectic 
coordination? 
To elaborate answers to these questions, our account of integration in Europe must 
first be brought to a further and more advanced state. In fact, if in subsection 1 the 
identification of the distinctive elements of Europe’s constitutional frameworks 
justified the latter to be analysed in isolation, in subsection 2 their relational 
dimension has been addressed essentially for the purpose of highlighting the effects 
of their interactions on their identities. Nevertheless, even in this latter scenario the 
constitutional frameworks appeared in a state of artificial isolation. Despite the 
emphasis on interaction, accounts for convergence fail to convey the reality of the 
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social and legal practice in Europe. In those analyses Europe’s constitutional 
frameworks come out as compartmentalised bodies applying to distinct and definite 
substantive domains – a condition that hardly fits current European legal reality. To 
a remarkable extent, in fact, European social and legal practices cut across Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks. This is made possible by the extensive overlap between 
the substantive domains of the EU and member states’ legal orders, and by the 
porousness of their boundaries, increasingly trespassed by the interconnections 
between the national and supranational circuits of personal, material and functional 
integration. In contemporary Europe, indeed, legislation, administration, 
adjudication and, arguably, even constitution-amending may already be regarded as 
chains including supranational and national rings. But does this mean that 
contemporary Europe has its own European legal order? Or, at least, that integration 
across Europe’s constitutional frameworks is evolving in that direction, one that 
ultimately could reflect Smend’s unitary process?  
Much of current European constitutional scholarship would probably answer in 
affirmative terms. Mainstream discussion on Europe’s constitutional setting, even if 
phrased in the language of constitutional pluralism, sometimes seems to assume the 
existence of a single and unified European legal order,159 where Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks could arguably be regarded as moments of a unitary 
process of dialectic coordination. In such a context, constitutional republican 
democracy, as embedded in the dignified part of the EU constitutional framework, 
would offer the main strategy of integration, while states’ constitutional frameworks 
would end up being subsumed in such broader and encompassing federal system. 
Nevertheless, alternative views can be proffered to contest a similar constitutional 
outcome for European integration. In analytical terms, it can be noted that if it might 
be accepted that social practices develop in a one-dimensional European space, that 
does not equally apply to their legal regime. Integration across Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks has not yet achieved a state where a single constitutional 
vocabulary may equally be used for the different segments of policy-making or 
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adjudication in which that is articulated. Indeed, EU and states’ institutions remain 
firmly rooted in their respective legal orders and, as such, they are expected to refer 
to their native constitutional ideologies, cognitive models and institutional devices.160 
The disjunction between unified social practice and segmented constitutional 
frameworks is so ingrained in the European context that policy-making and 
adjudication reflect it to a remarkable extent. As noted,161 in many political and legal 
disputes arguments taken from the EU or states’ common constitutional traditions 
are strategically employed to shift the relevant epistemological framework and 
define the set of participating actors. ‘Integration across’, therefore, does not 
necessarily entail a reconciled European legal order. On the contrary, that disjunction 
signals that processes of personal, material and functional integration across 
Europe’s constitutional frameworks take place in an uneasy terrain. Let us briefly 
summarise their current configuration as resulting from the combination of the legal 
orders of the EU and its member states. 
Contemporary Europe is probably not the setting for grand exercises of constituent 
power.162 In fact, personal integration is the level where segmentation between 
Europe’s constitutional frameworks is more visible and spectacular. As underlined in 
previous subsection, it is not just a question of the different natures of the 
supranational and national polities, not least of the discrepancy between their 
respective procedures of engagement in constitutional politics. Segmentation reflects 
essentially the inconsistency between their strategies of integration and relevant 
conflicts. Therefore, if personal integration is really about embodying, representing 
and maintaining the unity of the polity and its fundamental legal convictions, 
Europe as a whole does not seem at the moment to have either a catalyst subject or a 
strategy of integration to perform a similar function. Conversely, the problematic 
coexistence of polities and strategies differently structured is the qualifying element 
of the European constitutional space. 
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To a large extent this uneasy situation reverberates through the circuits of material 
integration. Admittedly, in the economic and social area the EU and national 
judiciaries are formidably interfaced with the preliminary ruling procedure. Hence, 
segmentation at procedural level is most of the time the product of a poor respect of 
those terms of engagement or of principled (and sometimes interested) conflicts of 
authority between the Court of Justice and national supreme or constitutional courts. 
Yet it does not take only a sound procedure to avoid segmentation. Cases such as 
Grogan163 or, more recently, Laval164 demonstrate how litigation across Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks is amenable to competing substantive principles and, 
critically, alternative constitutional qualifications. In such circumstances, it is often 
for ordinary courts to identify the relevant constitutional background, and, if 
required, to channel the case accordingly towards the appropriate supreme 
adjudicative body. 
Although crucial in conveying the tensions associated with integration across 
Europe’s constitutional frameworks, material integration is an increasingly 
peripheral process. As evidenced in subsection 2, the construction of substantive 
constitutional principles in the member states continues to be mostly a function of 
the contents of economic legislation. And also market regulatory principles, in a 
context of expanding positive harmonisation, are remarkably narrowed down. This 
leaves broad room for functional integration, a circuit that on its part is marked by 
the rise of the governments and executive rule making.165 Perhaps contrary to 
Smend’s sensibilities – he denied that the technical nature of administrative law 
permitted functional integration166 – delegated legislation and, more generally, 
political administration associated to comitology and standardisation167 are the core 
of that process. 
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It has been previously documented how the statist tradition of political rights is on 
the decline in both the EU and national constitutional frameworks.168 At this stage it 
can be added that functional integration across Europe’s constitutional frameworks 
takes place increasingly in administrative networks disembedded from their national 
political contexts and requiring the definition of new vectors of accountability.169 
Indeed, executive rule making has inherited the aura of neutrality originally 
associated with both the national administration and the common market project. Yet 
the exposure to the normative claims typical of the tradition of state 
constitutionalism has made it a target of constitutional criticism whose ultimate goals 
are the improvement of the standards of transparency and accountability170 and the 
direct participation of affected parties.171  
 
4. Questioning Integration 
The normative tenor of the latest consideration sets the tone for a few concluding 
remarks. If there is a merit in the above analysis, that is to demonstrate how 
integration, particularly if defined according to Smend’s notion, may provide an 
adequate constitutional frame for treating Europe’s three types of conflict. 
Integration, indeed, comes out not only as the “central substance” of Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks, but also as the “fundamental process” that could guide 
their interactions.  
The power of this conceptual device is not confined to an explanatory dimension. 
Integration may also deliver in normative terms as far as it permits to pursue 
coherent constitutional solutions in the absence of an ultimate uncontested authority. 
In this regard, the notion of convergence seems particularly promising for its claims 
for substantive awareness and respect for the distinctiveness of Europe’s 
constitutional identities suggest a form of revised teleology as the blueprint for 
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sound institutional practices.172 Convergence, in fact, may be a source of inspiration 
not only for a theory of constitutional adjudication but, more generally, for a modus 
operandi with which all principled institutions173 in Europe’s constitutional 
frameworks could be expected to comply in order to ensure overall constitutional 
coherence. 
Yet the fact that coherence through convergence may be a valid option in managing 
Europe’s legal conundrums does not say much about its dividend in terms of social 
integration and, notably, about the capacity of the current constitutional setting to 
cope effectively with Europe’s economic and social conflicts.174 Legal integration 
through Europe’s constitutional frameworks, indeed, may perhaps be attractive for 
the European elites and the constitutional clergy. But what about the citizens that 
ideally should give substance to that process and, in the meanwhile, draw 
inspiration from it? Are they better off with this emerging system of transnational 
constitutional integration? And what does that deliver for them? 
An important though too often neglected answer to those questions could be that this 
very process of integration has transformed Europe from a set of societies whose 
economies had thrived on war and colonies to a set of societies that tried to 
implement systems of social justice and peaceful trade.175 Although even such 
statement is not completely uncontroversial,176 that is probably the main argument in 
defending the legitimacy of European integration. Yet that is too partial and, 
ultimately, fragile a justification. Legitimacy cannot only reside on outputs, be they 
the opportunities associated with the common market or the promise of an area of 
freedom, security and justice. A serious commitment to integration requires also 
social and political engagement – goals that hitherto seem to have been somewhat 
achieved only within national constitutions. 
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In this regard, Fligstein’s recent account of EU conflicts offers a provocative 
empirical insight.  European integration, he observes, has generated three social 
constituencies.177 The first includes the subjects who are inclined to see the EU as a 
social and political opportunity. Predictably, they are the insiders of European 
integration, a minority that has organised its economic and social life largely in a 
transnational dimension and, by doing so, has ended up shaping the common 
market project according to its social and political preferences. At the other extreme 
one finds the social constituency of the outsiders of European integration. They are 
European in a thinner sense as their social lives take place mostly, if not exclusively, 
within their home states’ borders. As a consequence, their participation in that 
transnational process is more marginal, consisting essentially in the passive role of 
consumers of a broader range of products and services and, for those who can, in the 
use of the Euro currency. Outsiders’ attitudes towards European integration, 
therefore, are the most problematic. To their eyes, Europe tends to be a constant 
source of threats since it may foster the deployment of firms, immigration, 
competition by cheaper products, constraints on states’ budget, welfare and 
industrial policy. There is finally a more ambiguous “swing constituency”. It is 
probably the most populated and it includes the so-called “situational Europeans”, 
i.e. those who occasionally profit from free movement but, at the same time, are 
concerned by the possible negative impact of the common market on national 
welfares. In many ways this is also a crucial constituency for its political attitude 
towards the EU has often proved to be decisive for the destiny of the latter. 
In fact, many of the recent political conflicts involving the EU, most notably the 
failure of the Constitutional Treaty, may be traced back to such EU clash.178 EU clash 
– probably, the best approximation of Europe’s reconfigured economic and social 
conflicts – combines elements of both first and second type conflicts. On the one 
hand, one may note elements echoing old class struggles: the uneven participation179 
in the European transnational society depends largely on the individuals’ and social 
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groups’ capacity of access and mobility – variables that evoke too well known factors 
of social discrimination. Yet depicting the EU clash as a mere replication on a 
European scale of first type conflicts would be tantamount to offering its caricature. 
European integration is a more diagonal project, one that winners and losers of first 
type conflicts can experience in turn as a threat or an opportunity. The cases of 
incumbent monopolistic economic actors and intra-Community migrants are only 
the most evident amongst a variety of possible examples which may falsify that 
simplistic image. 
With this in mind, the EU clash can be looked at as a privileged standpoint for a 
critique of Europe’s current constitutional structure. Fligstein’s social insight could 
help to dramatise the story so far told. It might be argued that at their inception 
national constitutions were adopted on the assumption that the lives of Europeans 
would have taken place in a mostly domestic dimension. In this view, first type 
conflicts were a kind of purely internal situation and domestic constitutional 
democracy their appropriate deliberative framework. Meanwhile, European elites 
pushed forward via their member states the common market, a project that they 
seized by nourishing the circuits of transational litigation and orienting positive 
harmonisation. Yet the outputs of that process are not directed only at the members 
of this EU elitist society. Due to the overlaps and porousness of Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks, EU regulatory strategies spill over all the peoples who 
live in Europe, a fact that can still be appreciated when national political 
communities are enlisted in implementing EU objectives.180 True, democratic reforms 
have remarkably revised the contents and the institutional architecture of the 
common market project, and also the membership of the EU transnational society is 
increasingly broadening. Nonetheless, Fligstein’s account of the EU clash warns of 
the persisting social and, arguably, constitutional bias of European integration.  
This does not mean to say that the EU strategy of integration should be changed 
or replaced. A large part of this article has been devoted to arguing precisely the 
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opposite thesis, namely how the dialectic interactions between Europe’s 
constitutional frameworks can deliver. The insights on the EU clash, then, may be 
best regarded as inviting discussion on the partiality of Europe’s circuits of personal, 
material and functional integration. It has already been noted how in contemporary 
Europe’s constitutional frameworks personal integration is a highly segmented 
circuit where the civilising potential of supranational integration181 clashes with the 
right to self-government of national political communities. Lacking a comprehensive 
constitutional framework, their reconciliation and balance are objectives to be 
pursued only on a case-by-case basis by trying to accommodate those competing 
normative claims and epistemologies. On their parts, material and functional 
integration face the most serious challenges. First of all, there are questions as to the 
remit and intensity of Community regulatory principles and policy-making: to what 
extent is it legitimate for supranational forms of integration to pre-empt national 
ones? Or, in other words, to what extent is it acceptable that the members of the EU 
society rule over the peoples who live in Europe? Of course, such questions involve 
ever-greens such as the division of competences, subsidiarity, and the intensity of EU 
policy-making. Yet, it may be argued that the challenge here is more demanding than 
drawing artificial borders between legal orders and making the scope for 
supranational integration somehow proportional to its degree of inclusiveness. 
Concern for social integration, in fact, raises questions as to the current structure of 
the circuits of material and functional integration. Here, the issue is not only about 
improving the standards of accountability and, notably, the transparency and 
openness of administrative and judicial decision-making. Critically, the participation 
of a broader social constituency in EU policy-making invites a more radical 
discussion on due process, including the adoption of more robust procedural 
entitlements aiming at effective access to justice and administrative procedures.  
In concluding Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht Smend observes that the main problem 
for a constitution is its integrative capacity.182 At the moment Europe’s constitutional 
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organisation allows for the silent prevarication of an active EU society over the more 
indifferent peoples living in Europe. Alienation of the latter is often confused with 
loyalty to the European integration project, a misunderstanding that punctually 
surfaces when the indifference of public opinion to the EU policies turns to 
opposition to the EU system.183 That might be quite a concern for the strength of 
Europe’s constitutional frameworks. 
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